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INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, cognitive-behavioral theories of depression
have increasingly incorporated both cognitive and environmental parameters to account for the complex symptomology present in depressive
disorders.

These. theories place primary emphasis on the role of c.ogni-

tions in determining emotions; that is, one's beliefs about events are
seen as ce.ntral to depressive emotions.

Considerable research supports

these contentions.
Recent research by Gordon Bower (1981) provides additional data
concerning the relationship between emotion and cognition.

Bower sug-

gc:sts that emotion serves as a memory unit that enters into associatio1i.s
with coincident events.

Activation of this emotion aids in retrieval.

of events associated with it and primes themes for other cognitive processes.

In the group of studies associated with this theory, Bower has

obtained significant results relating hypnotically-induced emotions-and
cognitive processes.
Hhile Bov1er' s research has significant implications for theories
of depression, two questions arise from this research.

The first con-

cerns demand compliances resulting from the hypnotic manipulations.
Although Bower has defended this criticism with related research, additiorial studies should be carried out.

A second question is related to

the generalizability of Bower's results.
1

The generalizability of these

2

results may be evidenced if research in naturalistic settings also found
a relationship between emotions and cognitive processes.

Partial re-

plications in normal or clinical settings might adequately demonstrate
the relevance of Bm-1er' s findings in a clinical setting.

The following project was designed to expand upon Bm-1er's research
and study various degrees of unmanipulated (naturally-occurring) depression in a normal population.

Specifically, the relationship of various

levels of depression and word associations, the content

of affect-laden

word recall, the amount of total recall, the amount and affect of interjections, and the ordering of recall were observed.

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Introduction
Philosophers have related affect and cognitions for 2000 years.
Kant suggested that reason synthesizes experiences according to its own
nature and our understanding of the outside world is possible only in
terms of our modes of perception.

Kant's philosophy maintained that the

lm.;s of man rietermined v1hat laws of nature can be discovered.

Dynamic

theorists have also addressed the issue of the relationship between affect and cognitions for nearly 90 years (James, 1890; McDougall, 1921);
In the last decade cognition and affect have again become major areas
of theory and research in depression following several years of inaetivity due to the popularity of strict behaviorism and its extreme stimulus-response approach.

One reason some researchers have returned to

studying cognition is that many responses are not predictable from the
stimulus situation alone.

Cognitive events intervene between the two

tc sufficiently warrant attention.

In this short time, some theorists

have come to vietv affective states from both operant and cognitive terms.
The following sections will be devoted to contemporary theories
and relevant issues about depression as viewed by cognitive-behavioral
researchers.
fined.

First, three ways of classifying depression will be de-

Next, an extended view of the cognitive determinants of depres-

sion t,Jill be presented.

Regarding this theme, several researchers have

proposed that depressed people interpret their world and themselves
3

4

differently than nondepressives (Beck, 1972; Ferster, 1974; Rehm, Note l;
Seligman, 1975).

Recent research by Bower (1981) suggests that emotions

pm.;rerfully influence specific cognitive processes through an associative
network process.

In summary, this review intends to show the increasing use of cognitive explanations to depressive behavior.

Specific attention will be

given to research relating depression to selective attention, memory,
and associations.

' __./'/Researchers classify and define depression in a variety of \-rays
I

'

from a simple mood state to a complex syndrome consisting of behavioral,
cogniti~e,

'

affective, and physiological parameters (Becker, 1974).

In

general, these classifications fall into three groups (Roth, 1977):

f

-I
j

qualitative classifications, dimensional or trait classifications, and
cognitive-behavioral classifications.

\
\.~'

(The first group of classifications consists of theorists who have

cldo~ted

a symptom cluster model and propose "qualitatively" distinct

types of depression.

Types of depression are differentiated on the

basis of symptomology, etiology, response to treatment and background
factors (age, family history,

etc.)-~·7 In

the past, one of the most fre-

quently used nosological systems was the American Psychiatric Associa-:
;.-/

tion Diagnostic Criteria (DSM II, 1968).i The seven depressive syndromes

u·

cited \>Jere:

psy(~hiatric

depressi\,e reaction, ·manic depression--depres-

sed typ0; manic depression-manic type; manic depression-circular type;
involutional depression, neurotic depressive reactions, and cyclothymic

.

_../'"

5
I

personality. (Each subtype was differentiated from the other on the ·
basis of etiological and/or symptomatic factors.

For instance, both

psychotic and neurotic depressive reactions were thought to be precipitated by environmental stresses while the remaining subtypes were related

t(>

physiological, constitutional, and genetic variables.

Similar-

ly, mB.nic-depressive patterns were discriminated from involutionaldepression on the basis of past symptoms, and from cyclothymia on the
basis of symptom severity.

1
I\.

Recently, the diagnostic criteria were revised (DSM III, 1980).

The revision lists the following depressive syndromes:

major depres-

sion, single episode; major depression, recurrent; bi-polar disorder,
mixed; bi-polar disorder, manic; bi-polar disorder, depressed; cyclothymic, and depressive neurosis.

Each subtype is differentiated from

the other on the basis of three axes:

clinical syndromes, personality
........

and developmental disorders,arrl physical disorders and

condition.~d

In

addition to those distinctions, a clinician can also use two additional
supplement uiagncses:

severity of psychosocial'stressors and highest

level of adaptive functioning in the past year.
Ar.other proponent of the qualitative classification of depresis idnoker and his associates (1970) who have differentiated sub..,.
types of depression in terms of depressive symptoms and the presence
of other psychiatric disorders.
reactions, primary
turbanc.e.

affectiv~

~-·grief rea~·· tion

He has made distinctions between

disturbance and secondary affective

~rief
dis~~

is eonsiderec a loss induced, transient

!--'

depressive episode.

A diagnosis of primary affective reaction is given

6

if the client has no other psychiatric disorder, and secondary

~ffective

reaction is indicated when a preexisting psychiatric dysfunction was
~

--;

evident. \ Winoker further divides primary affective reactions into uni)

_A

polar subgroups along a similar line of thinking./
i

Another type of qualitative classification of depression is em/

...

~

~

played through sophisticated statistical instruments{

'

Cluster
________
-·------------

analysE~§____ _
.,

...

~

(Everitt, 1.972) and factor analytic procedures (Fleiss, Lawlor, Platman,
and Fieve, 1971) have been used to isolate qualitatively distinct types
and subtypes of dcpressio;;_-·7 Grinker, Miller, Sabashin, Nunn, and
Nunally (1961) performed onk of the earliest factor analytic studies of
depression.

The resulting types were:

empty depression, angry depres-

sian, hypochondriacal depression, and anxiety depression.

Friedman,

Cowitz, Cohen and Granick (1963) isolated subtypes similar to that of
Grinker et al., (1961).

The second group of classifications conceptualizing depression
as a family of disorders, each of \vhich differs with regard to the
severity nr intensity of experienced symptomologyi

This type of classi-

fication is called the "dimensional" or "trait" conceptualization of
depression.

Unlike type theorists, a trait theorist does not view de-

pret;sio·a as encompassing a variety of qualitatively distinct syndromes.
Distinct syndromes may exist but they are viewed as being reduceable
1ic, a finite number of corrnuon dimensions in which individual differences

are best rcpreser<ted as gradations along a single dimension (unidimen·sional sys rem), or along a combination of several dimensions (rnul ti ·dimensiouol systern)1 A second assumption of this approach to dassi-
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fication is that the nature of the depression has a basic underlying
feature, that is, a client is seen as "generally depressed."

It is

also assumed that the depression is a covariation of one or more of
discrete symptoms (or traits) which are obtained by conventional factor
analytic procedures.

Since a trait is independent, a high score on one

gives a researcher little or no information about any remaining traits.
Variation in blends among the basic traits accounts for the variability
of clinical depressions (Rosenthal and Gudeman, 1967).
A variety of unidimensional systems have been derived.

For ex--

ample, Klerman (1971) and Zubin and Fleiss (1971) state that psychotic
and neurotic depressions are not qualitatively distinct and only differ
in regard to symptom intensity.

Similarity, Kendell (1968) and Kendell

and Gourlay (1970) suggest that the traditional endogenous-reacttve ·
dichotomy (Hamilton and \Vhite, 1959; Kiloh and Garside, 1963) may instead be symptom clusters occupying opposing ends of a single depressive
trait.
Multidimensional trait systel!lS are common in the field.

The vari-

ety may in part be attributed to use of different subject populations
(inpatient, outpatient, college students) and different measures of depresrdoa (l'iXPI-D, Beck Depression Inventory, Nul tiple Depression Inven-

tory).

The common theme contained in all these multidimensional systems

ir; that underlying all depressive states is a "general" depressive

disorder containing several "group" or "specific" factors.
Perhaps the most investigated multidimensional system is that of

8

endogenous-reactive depression.

Traditionally, reactive depression \vas

thought to be environmentally precipitated while endogenous depression
was linked to internal physiological causes.
ported symptomatic differences.

Trait theorists have re-

For instance, Kiloh and Garside (1963)

evaluated 92 clinically diagnosed "endogenous" or "reactive" subjects
on 35 measures (age, previous attacks, etc.).

T\vo factors accounted

for a large portion of the variance, a "general" depression factor and·
a bi-polar factor related to the endogenous-reactive dichotomy.

Speci-

fie symptoms such as self pity, existence of a precipitant, inadequacy,
initial insownia, depression worse in the morning, agitation, obessessions, hypochondriacal complaints, etc. were related to the reactive
end of the rlimension.

Other symptoms such as early morning awakening,

depression worse in the evening, onset in fourth decade of life, etc.
were loaded on the endogenous end of the dimension.

Similar patterns

have been found by other researchers (Hamilton and White, 1959; Carney,
Roth, and Garside, 1965; Kiloh, Andre>Ys, Nielson, and Bianchi, 1972;
Mendels and Cochrane, 1968).

T

The third major way of classifying depression does so in terms of

the frequency of occurrence of specific behaviors, thoughts, and physiologicat symptoms.

This is referred to as the cognitive-behavioral

classificatio·n of depression1 These theorists assume that no t\vO depressions are identical; each comprise a unique set of deficits and excesses.
symptoms.

No assumptions are made about covariation among depressive
That is, the vppearanc.e of one symptom does not suggest cer-

tain others are expected.

Ferster (1973, 1974) was one of the first

9

behaviorists to advance this position when he viewed depression as involving a reduced frequency of "adjustive behaviors," an increased frequency of avoidance and escape responses, and a passive behavioral mode
of controlling one's environment.

Variations of the basic behavioral

framework attributing varying degrees of importance to the cognitive
component in depression have been advanced by a number of other researchers (Beck, 1972; Rehm, 1977; Seligman, 1974, 1975; Williams, Barlow,
and Agros, 1972).

It is important to note that all of the theories in

this classification of depression in some way implicate cognitions. -In
some, the cognitive alterations are
they are central to depression.

vie~·red

as symptoms while in others

The folloHing sections will be devoted

to contemporary cognitive-behavioral theories providing frameworks from
which one can expla.i.n both overt-motoric symptomology and verbal-cognitive syrnptornology.

Both environmental and cognitive parameters are con-

sidered causal factors.
Cognitive-Behavioral }Iodels of Depression
This section is an elaboration of the previously described ''cognitive-behavioral" classification of depression.

As stated before,

theories in this classification of depression incorporate both environmental and cognitive factors of causality to different degrees.

First,

theories heavily weighing the environmental causes of depression will
be

revie~ved.

The remaining cognitive-behavioral theories of depression

will be reviewed in order of increasing prominence of the cognitive
factor.

10
_!)ehavioral Perspectives.

A number of theorists have suggested that

depression is related to an insufficient amount of reinforcement (Lazarus,

1968; Liberman and Raskin, 1971; Lewinsohn, 1974, 1975; Ferster, 1974;
Coyne, 1976).

Lev1:Lnsohn and his colleagues (1974) have developed a

model of depression which best represents this viewpoint.

Classical

and operant conditioning processes are both involved in their frame\.JOrk.
Specifically, a low rate of response contingent reinforcements acts as
an unconditional stimulus eliciting a variety of depressive symptoms
(verbal statements of dysphoria, self depreciation, rejection, guilt,
fatigue, sleeplessness, loss of appetite, headaches, etc.).

Once eli-

cited, these symptoms are maintained in an operant fashion through social
reinforcement (sympathy).

A low rate of reinforcement places the de-

pressed person on a extinction schedule.

Other depressive response

patterns are subsequently developed and maintained i.e., the behaviors
cause the depressed person to be avoided, the individual receives less
reinforcement, and continues to behave in depressed ways.
Lewinsohn argues that obtained reinforcement is a function of:
(a) the number of events Hhich an individual finds potentially reinforcing; (b) the number of potential reinforcers available; and (c) the
individual's ability to obtain available reinforcers (1974, p. 158).
Lewinsohn has primarily examined the relationship between depression
and low rates of response contingent positive reinforcement.

The dif-

ferential amounts of reinforcement \.;hic:h depressed clients and their
families obtain has been systematically evaluated.

Using a verbal in-

teraction coding system, Le\.;insohn and Shm,; (1969) found that a minimal
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amount of time \vas spent discussing topics which Here reinforcing to the
depressed client relative to the time spent on topics reinforcing to
the spouse.

Similar results Here found in a number of naturalistic set-

tings (Martin, Heinstein, and LeHinsohn, Note 2; LeHinsohn and AtHood,
1969; Lewinsohn and Shaffer, 1971).
In more rigorously controlled investigations, the emphasis remained
on the covariation of mood and reinforcing activity.
Libet (1972) examined depressed patients,

LeHinsohn and

nondepressed psychiatric con-

trols, and normal controls and found a significant correlation betHeen.
their mood (Depression Adjective Checklist, 1965) and the number of pleasant activities in 1.ihich they engaged (MacPhillany and LeHinsohn Pleasant
Events Schedule, 1971).

The results of this study Here replicated by

LeHinsohn and Graf (1973).

In a similar procedure, MacPhillany and

Lewinsohn (1974) found that depressives reported distinct types of activities over the s2me period as controls.

\.fuen all subjects rated the

Pleasant Events Schedule items in terms of the reinforeing value, depressives' ratings Here significantly lmver than those of nondepressives.
This supports LeHinsohn' s contention that depressives experience fe,·ler
events or activities as potentially reinforcing.
Other researchers have reported findings to support this framework.
Wener and Rehm (1975) found that individuals receiving lo\v levels of
reinLJrcement became more

depres~>ed

amounts of reinforcement.

Lazarus

than individuals receiving high
(1968)~

Liberman and Raskin (1971),

HcrsLn, Eisler, Alford and Agras (1973), and McLean, Ogston, and Grauer
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(1973) have reported that they have treated clients with low levelG of
reinforcement.

Improvement in all of these cases was correlated with

obtaining more reinforcement.

Finally, a number of investigators have

found depression to covary with the occurrence of "life stressors"
(events \vh:ich a behaviorist would designate as losses of actual or potential reinforcement).

Paykel, Meyers, Dienelt, IClerman, Lindenthal,

and Pepper (1969) found that within the six month period prior to intervie\vS, depressives experienced signficantly more losses (marital,
occupational, social, familial, etc.) than the controls.

The results

were essentially replicated by Leff, Roatch, and Bunney (1970) \vho examined endogenous and non-endogenous inpatients.

Le\·linsohn has suggested that inadequate social skills may partially account for the depressive's infrequent receipt of reinforcement.
This relationship has been assessed in group (Lewinsohn, Heinstein, and
Alper, 1970; Libet and Lewinsohn, 1973), familial (Shaffer and Lew·insohn,
Note 3), and laboratory contexts (Stewart, Note 4; Rosenberry, Heiss,
and Lewinsohn, Note 5).

Several findings emerged.

Rosenberry et al.,

(Note 5) found that depressed. subjects Here less predictable and homogenous in emitting rapport-inducing and supportive communications.
Libet and Lewinsohn (1973) found that depressives engage in fewer

acti~

vitic:s, emit proportionately less reinforcers, communicate with a more
restricted range of individuals, and take a longer time to respond to a
veroalization.

Steward (Note 4) also found depressives to react slov7er

to verbal and non-verbal prompts than nondepressives.
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All together, rather extensive data has been collected to support
LeHinsohn's hypothesis that depression is linked to low rates of response
contingent positive reinforcement.

However, this model is unable to ac-

count for all the complexities of depressive responses.

In particular

it can be argued that depression is not directly related to low rates of
reinforcement but instead to cognitive processes which mediate between
the activity and the cognitive symptomology (Rush, Khatami, .and Beck,

1975).

It could also be that depressives do not attend to or remember

pleasant events and are minimally affected by their occurrence.

These

possibilities will be studied in a later section.

A second theoretical perspective which strongly lJeighs the environ-

mental Ce>Bponent in depression is exemplified by Ferster (1966, 1973,

1974).

Ferster's conceptual position on depression appears to be a link

bet,veen the environmentally and cognitively oriented theories.

Coming

from a radical behaviorist persuasion, Ferster studied both descriptive
and ft:n:::tional aspects of depression.

The description of depressive

disorders is seen as consisting of both behavioral deficits and excesses.

D.sfic.i.ts are defined as a reduced frequency of normal activities

(l97L;, p. 31).

"Frequency reduction" refers to rate and quantity al-

terations as well as occurrence and nonoccurrence of certain behaviors.
Behavioral excesses are related to deficit conditions for instance
~vhen

a

C(n~mlsive

A.ct:.ivity appears Hhen normal problem solving behaviors

are no l:)Pger emitted.

Fu~;ct

irmally, depression is assumed to be related to loss of ir.1-

14
portant discriminative stimuli, certain reinforcement schedules, aversive environmental influences, and cognitive distortions.

More specifi-

cally, Ferster contends that depression is apt to be precipitated by the
loss of a source of reinforcement or

stimuli leading one to emit posi-

tive behaviors (death of a spouse, loss of a friend, moving to another
city, change of job, etc.).

Lazarus (1968) suggested that the outcome

of such a loss is related to the individual's overall availability of
reinforcers.
F'erster also smv certain intermittent sl:'.hedules of reinforcement
as precipitants of depressive reactions.

From animal studies, certain

fixed schedules of reinforcement providing small gains for a large be-·
havioral expenditure results in a lmo1er rate of responding.

The lmvest

rate of behavior is seen immediately after reinforcement is adnlinlstered.

Depressed individuals often spend a great deal of effort in avoiding being punished by decreasing engagement in aversive behaviors.
Ferster (1973) suggests that this decreased belaavior leads to further
depression since "it commits such a large part of a person's repertoire
to activities th.=tt do not prodttce positive reinforcement " (p. 86 7).
Ferster (1973, 1974) goes beyond a strict stimulus-respo:1se explanation of depression however, to suggest that the individual's perceptLon of the \vorld affects his receiving of rei.nforc.ernent.

Hore

specifically, he speculates that the depressive has n limited view of
the

~vorld

stimuli.

and has difficulty disc:lminating among different
Because of these discrimination

difficultie~

cnvirol'mcr~tal

the Jepressive

15

is apt to emit a response inappropriate to the situation and be punished.

An example might be that a depressive considers home, work, and a party
all appropriate places to engage in depressive behaviors.

People at a

gala party may consider his strange behavior, avoid the individual, and
shut off another source of reinforcement.

Only partially recognizing

that punishment is contingent on the inappropriate

behavio~

the depres-

sive acquires a "lousy vie\v of the world" (Ferster, 1973, 1974).

The

environment is thought of as providing limited support, pleasure, and
much distress and unhappiness.

In summary, both Lewinsohn and Ferster expouse behavioral theories
of depression.

F(~rster

's approach has to a greater extent than Le1;11insohn' s

attempted to relate depression to both cognitive and environmental parameters.

He suggests that a one to one relationship bet'l.veen environmental

stimuli and depressive response does not exist and one must take into
account the non-observable cognitive processes which mediate.
-~nitive-Behavioral

Perspective_.

On the basis of small animal

analogue research, Seligman and his colleagues have developed a cognitive model of reactive depression in humans.

The major construct

utilized by this group is called "learned helplessness."

Learned help·-

lessne.ss vie-.;.1s depression as resulting from cognitions of responseoutcome independence:

that is, beliefs that consequences are independ-

ent of behavior.

Recently, Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale (1978) reformulated
the learned helplessness model of depression.

The reformulation

16

·recognizes the importance of attributions in predicting reactions to uncontrollable outcomes.

Attributions, i.e., explanations for events, may

be stable or unstable, global or specific, and internal or external
attributions of cause.

The type of attribution chosen influences whether

the future helplessness will be chronic or acute, broad or narrow, and
whether helplessness will lower self-esteem or not.

Seligman further

stated that individual differences in attributional style probably exist
and those who typically attribute failure to global, stable and internal
factors are most prone to general and chronic helplessness depressions
\vith low self-esteem.

Two pieces of research are particularly relevant in highlighting
the role of cognitive factors in the development of learned helplessness
patterns of behaviors.

Hirota and Seligman (1975) found that uncontrol-

lable experiences on amotoric task adversely affected performance on a
cognitive task and vice-versa.

The transfer of learned helplessness

experiences is seen as providing support for cognitions concerning response-reinforcement independence.

Additional support for the cognitive

interpretation comes from research directly manipulating the instructional set (Miller and Seligman, 1973; Hirota, 1974; Miller and Seligman,
197.5).

In particular, performance on a task Has found to vary according

to \vhether a subject was informed that the outcome is related to chanc.e
or skill.

Similar effects are found for a chance instructional set

and an actual helplessness experience (Hirota, 1974).
taken as support of mediating cogni.tions.

Again, these are

In the instructional set

paradigm the subject is "given" the cognitive pattern vhile in the actual
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learned helplessness situation the cognition is "learned" or "created"
by the subject.

Additional research has shown that the cognitive changes produced
in learned helplessness experiences are accompanied by a host of behavioral response patterns.

First, helpless subjects behave less aggressively

and less competitively than non-helpless subjects (Powell and Creer,
1969; }fuier, Anderson, and Liberman, 1972).

Passivity and retarded asso-

ciativity are more prominent after time (Overmier and Seligman, 1967;
Overmier, 1968).

Also, uncontrollable traumatic experiences are thought

to precipitate some physical and physiological dysfunctions.

Weight loss,

anorexia and norephineprine depletion have all been cited (Weiss, 1968;
Miller and Weiss, 1969; Weiss, Stone, and Harrell, 1970).

Seligman draw parallels between learned helplessness and depression
in areas of etiology and symptomology.

Symptomatically, Seligman only

draws parallels to reactive depressions consisting of:

passivity, ne-

gative expectations, lack of aggression, dissipation in time, and also
parallels weight loss, anorexia, and norephinephrine depletion (Seligman,
1974).

The etiology of a depressive episode is like learned helpless-

ness in that it is highlighted by the uncontrollability of reinforcement
(Teasdale, 1978).
1975).

The cognitions need not be accurate (Seligman, 197!•,

Aging, death of a loved one, loss of a job are considered pre-

cipitants of depression in that they limit one's control over the environment or lead one to believe that control does not exist.
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Seligman has also addressed the issues of prevention and treatment of learned helplessness.

In the past, treatment was seen as ex-

posing the helpless subject to situations in which the outcome is controllable (Seligman, Maier, Geer, 1968; Seligman, Rosellini, and Kozak,

1975; Klein and Seligman, 1976).

Prevention on the other hand Has seen

as a history of reinforcement contingent upon one's actions (Seligman
and Maier, 1967; Seligman and Groves, 1970; Seligman, 1975).

So, the

prevention and antidote of helplessness seemed to be the demonstrated
helpfulness of one's actions.

As a result of the reformulation, re-

searchers presently suggest a variety of prevention and treatment suggestions.

Therapists can aid depressed individuals by helping them to

change the estimated probability of aversive outcome, to change the
expectation from uncontrollability to controllability, or to change
their attributions for success or failure.

Abramson et al., (1978)

has suggested specific ways these suggestions can be implemented (p. 69,
Table 3).

For Seligman, the goal is the development of personal "competency"
cognitions.

Individuals must believe they are generally able to control

their environment.

Klein and Seligman (1976) reported that success on

a simple discrimination problem had a therapeutic effect on depressed
subjects' performance and beliefs of control.

Response contingent re-

inforcement is expected to help prevent depression (Seligman, 1974, 1975).

In sum111ary, Seligman has developed a theory of depression supported by extensive research.

He has argued that while environmental fae:-

tors cause the emission of depressive behaviors, they are mediated and
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probably secondary to the influence of cognitive factors.

An interest-

ing question arises here, especially for those subjects with the attributional style that typically attributes failure to global, stable, and
internal factors.

\fuy do depressives with this attributional style not

concentrate on their positive control experiences?

Perhaps their de-

pressive moods tend to cause them to associate to other depressive
situations.

It is also possible that their recall of positive contingent

reinforcement situations is poor.

~ogni!_iv~ Per~_p_ectives.

One of the most well knmm exponents of

the cognitive view is Beck (1967,

1970, 1974).

Beck argues that depres-

sian is not conceptualized as an affective disorder; but rather, as a
cognitive disorder.
r.r5<td

~vhich

The primary symptom of depression is the cognitive

refers to an organized system of negative evaluations of

oneself, one's future, and the environment.

Lo\-J self-esteem,· thoughts

of incompetency and inadequacy, poor body image, thoughts of impending
distress, and perceptions of environmental hurdles \-Jere all examples of
the depressive's cognitive set.

Behavioral and affective symptoms are

seen as consequences to the depressed cognitions.

Resear~h

conducted by Beck has been t-.;vofold.

The development of

a self--report. test of depression (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Hock, 1nd I;rl·nugh

1961) and a helplessness scale (Beck, Weissman, Lester, and Trexler,
1974) were the first focus of attention.

In addition, Beck has attempt-

eJ to support his contention that depressives have a negative view of
the:nse1 ve~;, thci1:: future and their environment.

Research has shm-m that
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depressives dream significantly more about themes of deprivation, rejection, depreciation, self-injury, distorted body image, etc., than
do nondepressives (Beck and Hurvick, 1959; Beck and Hard, 1961).

Sim-

ilarly, depressives' earliest recollections have more themes of rejection than those of nondepressives (Beck and Hard, 1961).

Depressed
~;.;rho

individuals are more likely to identify with a pictorial character

has had an unpleasant experience than a character who has avoided such
an experience or had a pleasant experience (Beck, 1967).

Beck (1972)

also reports that depressives are ;=tpt to down-grade their positive attributes when asked to compare them with their peers.

Finally, depres-

sed subjects exhibited weaker self reference recall than normals suggesting they may describe themselves inconsistently (Davis, 1979).

All

these studies support Beck's contention that depressives have a negative
viev1 of themselves, their future, and their environment.

Davis' study

(1979) may additionally suggest differential recall bet\·Jeen depressives
and normals.
In summary, Beck has developed a theory of depression which clearly emphasizes the role played by cognitive factors and deemphasizes the
relative importance of environmental parameters.

An important part of

Deck's research seems to be the distinction between the nominal and the
actual antecedent to depressive behavior.

In essence, cognitions

abo~!_

rather than physical stimuli often determine the course of one's behavior.
Rehm and eovmrkers have developed another cognitive theory of
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depression which is based on a modified version of Kaufer's self-control
model (Kanfer, 1970a, 1970b, 1971; Kanfer and Karoly, 1972).

Although

this model has been used as a method for achieving behavioral change, in
this context it will aid in explaining the occurrence of a variety of
depressive symptoms.

In particular, depressive behaviors are seen as

arising from maladaptive self control patterns.

Kaufer has argued

that behavior is maintained and altered by subject mediated regulatory
processes as well as the environment.

Self regulation consists of

three basic sequentially ordered operatioPs:
uation, and self reinforcement.

self monitoring, self eval-

Each of these will be described and

its relationship to depression presented.

The first component of Kaufer's model involves self monitoring.
Both internal and external stimulus and response events can be monitored.
Motoric respc.nses such as running, studying, hair pulling, etc., all
fall into this category.

Covert responses such as thoughts, imagery,

and sensations like auditory hallucinations (Rutner and Bugle, 1969),
obsessional thoughts (Mahoney, 1974), and critical self statements
(Hannum, Thoreson, and Hubbard, 1974) can be monitored.
In relating self monitoring processes to depression, a high frequency of negative verbalizations and a low frequency of potentially
enjoyable bEhaviors can be suggested.
sives have two such deficits.
than positive events.

Rehm (1977) argues that depres-

First, they attend to negative rather

Second, depressives are thought to give their

attention to immediate effects of their behavior rather than to its
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long term consequences.

With regard to the first notion,Beck (1972) has proposed a similar mechanism to account for cognitive distortions, namely that depressed individuals are seen as selectively abstracting the unpleasant
aspects of their experiences.
support for this concept.

A number of studies provide suggestive

Pluchtick, Platman, and Fieve (1970) have

examined the relationship between depression, ideal self-concept, and
actual self-concept.

Depression >vas found to correlate with negative

actual self concept rather than an altered ideal self concept.

One

might speculate that this is a result of selective attention and memory
from actual positive events toward actual negative events.

Roth (1977)

researched this hypothesis and although he did not find support for
differential memory of positive and negative adjectives, he did find
evidence of differential selective attention.

Relative to nondepressives,

depressed subjects monitored significantly more of their own negative
and significantly fewer positive behaviors.

Furthermore, it was post-

ulated that procedural parameters may have precluded the demonstration
of recall differences.

Cognitive distortions seen in depressives' self monitoring may
o.:::cur because depressives "expect the worst."

Friedman

(196!~)

reported

that Hilile depressives and nondepressives performed equally well on a
nun:he1.:

of tasks, the depressive expected to do worse.

Similarly, l\Iiller

m1Ci Seligman (1973), Klein and Seligman (1976), and Guza (1979) found

tlwt: depressed persons had lmver expectancies of success than nonde-

pr0ssed p2csons on laboratory tasks.

Beck (1972) also suggested that
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depressives are likely to entertain negative future oriented cognitions.
Hith this research supporting such negative self monitoring it is easy
to imagine why depressives may not look at the long term consequences
of their behavior.

Some studies suggest that when they do look at

longer range consequences, depressives then ruminate about the delayed
detrimental effects of their behavior (Schless, Schwartz, Goetz, and
Mendels, 1974; Beck, 1972; Seligman, 1975).

The second component of Kaufer's model is the self evaluatory process.

Monitored responses are evaluated against an internal criterion.

Performance may fall above or below this standard.

Rehm (1977) hypo-

thesizes two maladaptive patterns of self evaluation.

First, depressed

individuals often make inaccurate attributions of causality.

Second,

the depressive is likely to have stringent evaluative criteria.

Hith regard to attribution, Rehm argues that depressives ascribe
negative events to internal factors and positive events to external
factors.

For instance, a bad performance on a task would be due to per-

sonal inability while a good performance on the same task due to luck.
Miller and Seligman (1973) arguing for the independence of responding
and reinforcement, reported that depressives had lower expectancies

re~

garding the likelihood of future successes after behaving successfully
than did nondepressives.

The same finding has been replicated in t1.•o

other studies 0'1lller and Seligman, 1975; Klein and

Seligman~

1976).

One might infer the subjects attributed their success to external factors.
In addition to research support for external attributions, Guza (1979)
reported the depressives \vere more likely to make attrUJ'J.tir:>ns in an
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internal direction following feedback of failure at a task.
Rehm (1977) also proposed that depressives employ a stringent
self-evaluative criteria.

Rehm states the evaluative criteria for de-

pressed people may be characterized by a high threshold for "exceLlence"
and a low threshold for "failure."

Similar notions have been offered

by behavioral theorists (Marston, 1965; Bandura, 1971) and neo-analytic
theorists (Melges and Bowlby, 1969).

Common to all these perspectives

is the theme that the depressed person has unreachable and unrealistjc
goals and standards.

Investigations (Galin and Terrell, Note 6;

Murdock-Kitt, Note 7) have substantiated that depressed students tend to
set higher goal levels that did nondepressed students.

In addition,

therapists have reported anecdotally that depressed patients may employ
overly high criteria to evaluate their behavior (Bandura, 1971).

All in

all, studies support the hypothesis of depressed subjects having stringent self evaluations.
Some of the self evaluation research suggests a differential recall
component contributing to the stringent self evaluations of depressives.
DeHonbreun and Craighead (1977) and Nelson and Craighead (1977) reported
deprer;;sed subjects recalled less positive and more negative feedback
th<:1n controls at high levels of reinforcement.

Nelson et al (1977) also

reported that depressed subjects accurately recalled negative reinforce-ment '1-lhile normals underestimated the same.

These studies suggest that

emotional state may be related to the content of an individual's recall,
specifically mood may be related to recall of mood--congruous material.

25
The final stage of the self control chain involves self reinforcement.

Contingent self reward and self punishment enables an individual

to increase or decrease certain response patterns.

The effect of self

reinforcement on associated behaviors has been extensively reviewed by
Thoreson and Mahoney (1974) and Mahoney and Thoreson (1974).

Rehm (1977)

postulates that depression is characterized by high rates of self punishment and lov1 rates of self reward.
Support for the contention that depression is associated with maladaptive self reinforcement is obtained from three studies.

When sub-

jects were told to reward themselves if they thought they were incorrect
or not reinforce themselves when they were unsure of their responses,
Rozensky, Rehm, Pry, and Roth (Note 8) found that depressed patients administered more self punishments and fewer rewards than nondepressed
patients or normal control patients.
gard to actual correct responses.

The groups did not differ with re-

Roth, Rehm, and Rozensky (Note 9),

ww

partially replicated this study, found that depressed college students
emitted significantly more self punishments than nondepressed college
students.

Nelson and Craighead (1977) also report depressed subjects

self reinforcing less than controls but did not find different rates of
self punishment.

In general, studies support that reinforcement is re-

lated to more stringent requirements in depressed individuals.
Behavioral passivity is often cited as a core symptom of depression.

Many Lehaviorists argue that retarded movements, infrequent par-

ticipation in previously reinforcing activities, etc. are related to a
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lack of external reinforcement (Lazarus, 1968; Ferster, 1974; Lewinsohn,
1974).

Self control literature suggests that self administered and ex-

ternally administered reinforcements are equally able to maintain behavior patterns (Roth, 1977).

Summary.

Five theories of depression were described.

All these

theories of depression implicated cognition in some manner.

Lewinsohn

and Ferster suggest that the role of cognition in depression, if it exists
at all, is merely a symptom resulting from environmental influences.
Seligman proposes that cognition, plays a more important role in depression.

A cognition of learned helplessness, as a result of response-

outcome. inconsistency, becomes a mind-set through which future behaviors
are affected.
Beck and Rehm are the strongest advocates of the cognitive deteradnant in depressive behavior.

Both theorists suggest that cognitions

are central to depression rather than merely sumptoms of depression.
Beck's main premise states that cognitions about stimuli rather than the
physical stimuli determine the course of an individual's behavior.

Rehm

has developed a theory in which depressives' self monitoring, self evaluation, a.nd self reinforcement differ from normals.

Research suggests

that self evaluatfon and possibly self monitoring may be affected by
differential recall.
B~'?:~_E_y__P:~~~arc_!l_~~~~nition

and Emotion

Recently, Gordon Bower, a cognitive psychologist, presented several studies concerning the relationship

between mood and cognitive
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processes (1981).

Bower's work adds supporting data and a somewhat dif-

ferent perspective to the previously discussed cognitive theories of
depression.

\fuereas cognitive theories view affect as resulting from

cognitions, Bower introduced affect to aid in understanding memory and
cognition.

Theoretically, Bower approaches the relationship between depression
and cognitive processes from a strong cognitive perspective.

Still the

importance of emotions playing a causal role in behavior is illustrated
by his associative network theory of emotional behavior.

"In this theory,

emotion serves as a memory unit that can enter into associations with coincident events.

Activation of this emotion unit aids in retrieval of

events associated with it ... " (p. 129).

An emotion can also prime themes

for other cognitive processes such as free associations, interpretation
of ambiguous material, perceptual organizations, etc.
Three major areas of study have been opened under Bower.

In all

cases, research has primarily been done on subjects in >vhich happy or sad
moods have been induced hypnotically.
state-dependent memory.

One area of study concerns mood-

In a representative study (Bower, 1981), sub-

jects learned two lists of words, one '"hile happy and one while sad.
Tb~u

they -.:ere asked to free recall the original list while either in

the same or opposite mood.
called all in the same mood

Controls who learned both lists and free rewere also included.

Compared to the controls,

state-dependency appeared in better recall in the same-mood list and
1wrse

rt~call

in the opposite-mood list.

Emotional mood \vas a helpful

feature in distinguishing target material from interfering material.
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State-dependent effects were also found in subjects remembering personal
and childhood experiences.

That is, people remembered a greater percent

of experiences that were affectively congruent to the mood they were in
during recall.

A second area researched by Bower is that of emotion's powerful influences on cognitive processes such as free associations, fantasies,
social perceptions and snap judgments about others.

For example, Bower

(1981) demonstrated that mood significantly influenced the interpretation
of ambiguous scenes

from TAT cards.

This finding is consistent with the

research of Roth and Rehm (1980) demonstrating that mood biased categories used in interpreting ambiguous interpersonal scenes.

Clinically

depressed subjects rated their interview behavior as having significantly
.more negative and unskilled behaviors than nondepressed subjects.

This

also agrees with Rehm's (1977) hypothesis that depressives self monitor
their own behaviors more negatively than nondepressives.

Bower, Forgas,

and Krantz (cited in Bower, 1981) partially replicated this experiment on
college students hypnotized to feel either socially competent or incompetent.

Students feeling socially incompetent rated their behaviors

more negatively than students hypnotized to feel socially competent.

People's moods also had powerful effects on free associations they
gave to neutral words (Bower, 1981).

Hypnotized subjects generated

chained associates to five \-rords when they were happy and to another
five words ,.,-.hen they were angry.

When blind judges evaluated Hhether

the chain shoHed "happiness" or "anger" or "can't decide," they judged
anger accurately 83% of the time and happiness 73% of the time, signifi-
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cant at the .01 level.

Fisher and Marrow (1934) used hypnosis-induced

moods and Madigan and Ballenbach (Note 10) used moods induce:l

~y

the

Velton procedure with much the same results.
The associative network theory also implies mood affects snap
judgments of people or objects.

Isen, Shalker, Clark and Karp (1978)

found subjects gave more positive ratings on mock consumer surveys t.Jhen
they were feeling good after receiving a gift.

Bower (1981) found sub-

jects' thumbnail sketches of others were affected by their happy or angry moods.

It is suggested that current mood activates and primes mood-

congruent categories into readiness and these are used to assimilate and
classify ambiguous experiences.

The third area of study which Bower reviewed and resParched is that
of salience of mood-congruous material.

That is, people attend to and

retGember information which is emotionally salient to their mood.

Bower

gave tr..;o examples of subjects shmving lower recognition thresholds for
emotionally salient material.

Clore (cited in Bower, 1981) found that

happy and angry subjects responsed quicker and with less errors to moodsalient material.

Postman and Brown (1952) reported lmver recognition

thresholds (less bright exposures needed) for successes-versus-failure
words for subjects who had just experienced success or failure in an unrelated task.

Research also shows evidence of mood-salient memory.

In one ex-

periment (Bower et al., in press), subjects were made happy or sad by
post-hypnotic suggestion and read a balanced third person account of two
people, one tvho was happy-everything

Ha3

going well, and

onf~

Hho uas
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sad-everything was going wrong.

Subjects were found to identify with

the mood-salient character and reported that this character was the
central one in the story.

The next day \vhile in a neutral mood sub-

jects recalled more facts about the character who exhibited the same
mood they had felt the day before.

Because they were in a neutral

mood at the time of recall, this was a mood-congruous effect.

In

· another experiment (Bower, in press) subjects were induced to feel

hap~

py or sad by post-hypnotic suggestions and read about one character who
related an unrelated series of happy or sad incidents.
edly remember more incidents related \vith their mood.

Subjects reportHappy readers

recalled one and one half as many happy incidents as sad incidents and
sad readers recalled one and one third as many sad as happy incidents.
So, the mood contiguity effects seems to affect learning or wemory.

In

suw~ary,

Bower has investigated the effects of mood and cog-

nitive process in terms of a network theory.

Using primarily hypnotized

subjects, Bmver reported three major findings.

First, he reported a

strong mood-state-dependent effect of memory.

Secondly, he suggested

that emotions affect cognitive processes such as free association by assimilating and categorizing mood congruent categories into readiness.
Lastly, Bo\ver reported evidence in which learning or memory for moodcongruous material is higher than for

mood~discordant

material.

Bower's findings have strong implications for the cognitive theories of depression.

Bower's approach agrees with their basic premise

that cognitions are central to depression.

In addition, this research

E.:xtends cognitive models of depression by investigating the relationship
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between emotions and cognitive processes to further the understanding
of hmv cognitions influence behavior.

Specifically, Bmver suggests that

emotions have powerful influences on memory, associations, fantasies,
social perceptions, snap judgments, and salience of mood congruous material.

Differences in these cognitive processes, in turn, show up in

differences in behavior.

In sum, Bower's research as added supporting

data and somewhat different perspective to the previously discussed
cognitive theories of depression.
T\vo questions arise from this research.

The first is one that

Bower has raised, that is, do demand characteristics play a role in the
findings?

Bm·1er (1981) reports a series of experiments (Bower and Vallone,

cited in Bower, 1981; Stanislavski, 1936; and Teasdale and Fogarty,

1979) which attempt to distinguish bet,veen automatic versus demand compliance interpretations of the data.

Specifically, are the emotions

evoked by hypnotism real and if they are, were the subjects responding
naturally to the stimuli or were they responding to please the experimenter?

Although research attempting to control for demand character-

istics suggests that they do not play a role in the results, further
research in which demand characteristics are not involved is suggested.
A sc:concl question concerns the generalizability of Bmver's results.
Although the expected results are obtained by using experimentally induced moods, would naturally occurring moods found in the "re<:!l" world
still have discernible effects on cognitive processes?

To deter1nine

whether Bower's findings have relevance for understanding and treating
depression in clinical settings, research with subjects showing varying
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degrees of naturally-occurring depression is necessary.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Several cognitive-behavioral theories of depression have developed in the last decade.

Increasingly, these theories have incorporated

both cognitive and environmental parameters to account for the complex
symptomology of depression.

In addition to these parameters, there is

a move to include emotion and its relationship to depressive symptomology.

Gordon Bower (1981) has recently postulated the Associative Network

Theory to explain the relationship between emotion and cognitions.

In

the group of studies associated \vith this theory, Bower has obtained
results primarily through inducing moods with post-hypnotic suggestion.
Two questions arise from this research.
pliance biases.

The first concerns demand com-

Although Bower has defended this criticism with relat-

ed research, additional studies which control for demand compliance
should be carried out.

A second question is related to the generaliz-

ability of Bower's results.

Bower's research shows a remarkably strong

relationship between emotions and mood in a lab setting with hypnotic
induction of mood states.

If one wishes to determine the relevance of

Bower's results for the "real" world, research with less dramatic manipulations or in naturalistic conditions is necessary.

Partial repli-

cations using depressed and nondepressed subjects in normal or clinical
settings might adequately demonstrate the relevance of Bower's findings
for a clinical setting.
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The present study was designed to expand upon Bower's research
and its implications for understanding depression.

This project ex-

amined various degrees of naturally-occurring depression in a normal
population and its relationship to cognitive processes.

Specifically,

the relationship between levels of depression and word associations,
the content of affect-laden recall, the amount of total recall, the
amount and affect of interjections, and the ordering of recall were
observed.

HYPOTHESES
1.

Depression will be related to the affective content of what is re-

called.
a. High depressed subjects will remember more sad words than happy
words.
b. Low depressed subjects will remember more happy words than sad
words.
2.

Level of depression will be related to the total number of words re-

called.
a. Depressed subjects will recall the least number of words.
b. Normal (or medium depressed) subjects will remember more words
than the high depressed subjects but less than low depressed
subjects.
c. Lo>..r depressed subjects >vill remember the most words.
3.

Level of depression will be related to the order of recall.
a. High depressed subjects will remember sad words generally before the happy or neutral words.
b. Lmv depressed subjects will remember the happy words generally
before the neutral or sad words.

4.

Level of depression will be related to whether words are interjected

into recall.
a. Lo>..r and high depressed subjects Hill interject more Hords than
medium depressed (or normal) subjects.
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5.

Level of depression will be related to the nature of the words in-

terjected.
a. High depressed subjects will interject more sad

~vords.

b. Low depressed subjects will interject more happy words.
6.

Level of depression will be related to the nature of the chain asso-

ciations to neutral words.
a. High depressed subjects will chain associate more depressively
to neutral words while low depressed subjects will chain associate more positively to neutral words.

METHOD

Su_Ej_ects
The subjects in this study were undergraduate students who volunteered to participate in this experiment as an extra credit option for
their introductory psychology course.

They were divided into three

groups of high, medium, and low depression based on their score on the
Multiscore Depression Inventory (Berndt, Petzel, & Berndt, 1980), an
inventory designed to measure depression in a normal population.

Be-

cause it was difficult to get depressed subjects to volunteer for extra
credit, some subjects were called and asked if they wished to receive
extra credit for participating in a research project.

Information on

their depression level was available from a group of survey tests given
at the beginning of the semester.

To be in the high depression group,

subjects scored 50 or higher (one standard deviation above the mean) on
the MDI; the medium or normal depression group was based on subjects
who scored between 10 and 50 on the

~IDI;

and the subjects who scored 10

or below (one standard deviation below the mean) constituted the low
depression group.

In addition, to provide further validation of the

level of depression, the subjects were measured on the Beck Depression
Inventory.

The Beck scores for the three groups were as follm-1s:

Depression Group, H = 1.7, s.d. = 2.1; Medium Depression Group, H
4.4, s.d.

=

4.1; High Depression Group, M = 12.5, s.d. = 8.5; 83

subjects were used in all (Low-
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20, Medium-

42, High-

21).

Low
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Haterials
Beck Depression Inventory.

Subjects were given the Beck Depression

Inventory (BDI: Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Hock, & Erbaugh, 1961) and the
Multiscore Depression Inventory (MDI: Berndt, Petzel, & Berndt, 1980).
The BDI is comprised of 21 items, each of 'l:vhich represents a discrete
depressive symptom.

Each item includes graded statements pertaining to

the severity of the symptom.

The examiners endorse the statement best

matching their behavioral or experimental state.

An evaluation of the

internal consistency of the BDI (Beck, 1967) resulted in a reliability
of .86 using the Pearson r; with a Spearman Brown correction of this
rose to .93.

The traditional test-retest method of assessing stability

and consistency were not considered appropriate because the memory factory might inflate the score hm..rever, an indirect method of est:Lmating
the stability of the instrument found that changes in the score of the
inventory paralleled changes in clinical ratings (made by psychiatrists)
indicating a "consistent relationship of the instruments to the patient's
clinical state" (Beck, 1967, p. 195).

A concurrent validity of .75 was

found in a correlation between the BDI and the HHPI-D scale.

Also a

validity score of .66 was obtained between the BDI and the Depression
Adjective Check List.

Further measures of internal consistency, con-

current validity, and construct validity are available in Beck (1967).
M~ ti_§~or~~-

DEJJression

Invento~.

The Multiscore Depression Inven-

tory (MDI: Berndt, Petzel, and Berndt, 1980) is a multidimensional trait
s•::ale designed for normal populations which contains 118 items to be
marked true or false.

Besides providing a global (full scale) measure
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of depression, the MDI provides measures on ten subscales:

guilt, in-

strumental helplessness, learned helplessness, pessimism, energy level
(fatigue), low self esteem, sad mood, irritability, cognitive difficulty,
and social introversion.

The length of most of the subscales is 12 items

except for guilt \vhich has 10 i terns.
of 3.

test is 30 with a SD

Richardson reliability of r
samples.

The mean score of the full scale

The MDI full scale score has a Kuder

= .96 on initial and cross validation

More information of the reliabilities of the subscales is

available on Table 1.

Evidence of concurrent validity of the full scale

MDI was obtained by correlations with the BDI and the DACL

E < .001 and r

=

.77,

z

< .001, respectively).

(~

• 69,

Face validity of the sub-

scales was established by role playing students who scored higher on. the
scales after reading a character sketch (for all subscales

~ <

.001).

Results from ten clients in therapy provided criterion-related validity
for the full scale MDI and all its subscales (for the Fatigue subscale

E

< .01, for the Social Introversion subscale

z

scale HOI and all the other subscales .E < .001).

<

.05, and for the full
Further information of

reliability is available in Berndt, Petzel, and Berndt (1980).
Stimulus Words.

For the recall portion of this project, a list of

21 words (7 happy, 7 neutral, and 7 sad) were used.

The happy and sad

\vords v7ere picked from those found on the Depressive Adjective Check List
(DACL:

Lubin, 1967) which distinguished between depressed and nondepres-

sed people.
for normals.

The reliabilities of the DACL words range from .82 to .93
This indicates that subjects basically respond the same way

to a word over time.

Correlations between the DACL and the BDI as well
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TABLE 1
Internal Consistency Reliabilities for Original and Crossvalidated
Samples on the Total and Subtotal Scores on the MDI

Sample
Scale

Original
(n=200)
.87

Sad Mood

Cross
Validated
(n=263)

.86

Fatigue

.91

.91

Learned Helplessness

.83

.71

Social Introversion

.86

.84

Irritability

.84

.85

Instrumental Helplessness

.85

.87

Pessimism

.84

.85

Low Self Esteem

.86

.82

Cognitive Difficulty

.82

.82

Guilt

.79

.78

Full Scale MDI

.96

.96

Note.

------

From "Development and Initial Evaluation of a Multiscore

Depression Inventory" by D.J. Berndt, T.P. Petzel, and S.N. Berndt,
Journa~.

ot _£erson_::1.lit_y Assessment, 1980, 44(4), p. 396-403.
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as the Zung Depression Scale are significant at or beyond the .05 level
suggesting that identifications with these words are valid indicators
of depression (Lubin, 1967).

The neutral words were picked on the

basis of their neutral face validity.

The three categories of words

were matched on frequency of use (Kucera and Francis, 1967).

Each word

was printed on a 3 x 8 card in black magic marker and placed in random
order.

The resulting list of words given each subject 'vas:

Miserable,

Interested, Plant, Lost, Guarantee, Introduce, Somber, Lucky, Active,
Failure, Cheerful, Happen, Metal, Joint,

~onderful,

Enthusiastic, Invest, Heary, and Animate.
were in each category.

Burdened, Discouraged,

Table 2 explains which words

In addition, the experimenter had a half sheet

of paper Hith the list of words on it to record the number and order .of
the words recalled.
For the association part of the experiment, 5 neutral words were
picked on the basis of their face validity.
perience, Idea, Music, and Function.
sep::1rate 4 x 9 sheets of paper.

The words were:

Life, Ex-

The >vords were each placed on

Each sheet Hith a word had five lines

belo>v the >·lOrd where associations were written.

The five sheets for

each subject were stapled together with a cover sheet for directions on
the front.

Procedure
Each subject was seen individually for 45 minutes.

The subjects

began this experiment by taking the Multiscore Depression Inventory
and the Beck Depression Inventory, respectively.

They had been told

that the experiment '"as studying "the effect of certain personality
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TABLE 2
Recall Words Divided According to Affect

Happy Words

Neutral Words

Sad \\fords

Interested

Plant

Miserable

Lucky

Guarantee

Lost

Active

Introduce

Somber

Cheerful

Happen

Failure

Honderful

Metal

Burdened

Enthusiastic

Joint

Discouraged

Animate

Invent

Heary
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characteristics on cognitive processes."

Secondly, they were given the

word association packet \vhich had the following directions taped on the
cover page:

"On each of the follm..ring pages, look at the typed stimulus

word and write the first 5 words the stimulus brings to mind."

After

the subjects were finished with the vwrd associations, they were told:
Next, I am going to shmo1 you 21 words, one at a time. When I
finish, I would like to see how many you can remember. Just
recall as many as you can and I'll mark them down on this paper.
No one can remember them all, just recall as many as you can.
Any questions? Ready?
Each word was shown and verbalized to the subject one at a time for 2
second intervals.

The entire list was read and shm..rn to the subjects

and they were asked to verbally recall as many as possible.

After the

subjects had recalled as many as they could initially, the experimenter
asked if they wished to have more tine.
were also recorded.

Any additional words remembered

When the task was completed, the subjects \vere al-

lowed to look at the experimenter's list on which their responses were
recorded.

It was explained that the experimenter was interested in

which \vords as well as how many were recalled and how that might be related to subjects' scores on the inventories.

RESULTS
This study was designed to examine the relationship between depression and two cognitive processes, immediate recall and association.
Specifically, the six hypotheses were examined.
lationship between:

They involved the re-

depre·ssion and affective content of recall; depres-

sion and amount of total recall; depression and the order of recall;·
depression and the number and affective content of interjected words;
and depression and associations to neutral words.

The results are or-

ganized and presented as they apply to each hypothesis.
Depression and Affective Recall
Table 3 presents a mean number of happy, sad, and neutral words
rer.1embered in different levels of depression for all 83 subjects.

An

extremely orderly visual trend is seen in the direction of the hypothesis.

That is, subjects scoring as low depressed (happy subjects) recall-

ed an average of 3.277 happy words and only 2.666 sad words.

On the

other hand, high depressed subjects remembered on the average only 2.952
happy words and 3.330 sad words.

At all levels of depression, neutral

words were remembered at lower rates than happy or sad words (lo\v depression

2.444, medium depression

= 2.545, high depression

2.850).

Not only does there appear to be an orderly progression within each level
uf depression, there also appears to be expected results between each
level of depression.

That is, happy Hords seemed to be remembered on

the average more often by happy subjects than medium or high depressed
44
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TABLE 3
The Mean Number of Happy, Neutral, and Sad Words Recalled
at Different Levels of Depression for 83 Subjects

Neutral
Total
Sad
Happy
Words Recalled Words Recalled Words Recalled \vords Recalled
Lo\v
Depression

3.277

2.444

2.666

8.389

Hedium
Depression

3.182

2.545

3.1591

8.909

High
Depression

2.952

2.850

3.300

8.952

Average Words
Recalled

3.145

2,590

3.072

l.807

-------

46
subjects (3.277, 3.182, 2.95; respectively) and sad words appeared to be
remembered on the average more often by highly depressed subjects than
medium or happy subjects (3.330, 3.159,

2.66~

respectively). A further

investigation into the orderliness of these mean scores was accomplished
by breaking the large group of medium depressed subjects into two groups
called low-medium depression and high-medium depression.

The resulting

mean number of happy, neutral, and sad words showed smaller yet still
orderly results in the direction of the hypothesis.

This summary can

be seen in Table 4.

Several sets of analyses (a multivariate analysis, a univariate
analysis, and a regression analysis) were used to examine the relationship between depression and affective content of recall suggested by
Tables 3 and 4.

The results of these analyses are in the following para-

graphs.

A mu]tivariate analysis using level of depression (high, medium,
and low) as the predictor variable and number of happy, sad, and neutral
\oJOrds recalled vms performed.

There was no overall effect when a general

linear models procedure from the Statistical Analysis System (SAS, 1979)
was used.
none of

This procedure produced four different multivariate E scores,

~.,rhich

were significant:

HotelJing-LaHley Trace, .£.(6,154) = .71, NS;
Pillai's Trace, K(6,158) = .71, NS:
Wilk's Criterion, K(6,156) = .Jl, NS; and

Roy's Haximum Root Criterion, £(2,80) = 2.03, NS.
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TABLE 4
The Mean Number of Happy, Neutral, and Sad Words Recalled
Splitting the Medium Depression Group into Low-Medium
Depression and High-Hedium Depression

Happy Words
Recalled
Low-Hedium
Depression
(HDI: H-26)

3.24

Neutral Words
Recalled

3.08

\~en

Sad Words
Recalled

Total Words
Recalled

2.44

8.2

High--Hedium
2.58
3.00
3.21
Depression
(MDI: 28-44) ----------...!.------=-----____:_

8.5
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The failure to find significance with the multivariate analysis
would lead one to believe the univariate analysis of variance \•/Ould not
he significant.

This was indeed the case.

The analysis of variance

showed there was no relationship between the three levels of depression
and the number of neutral words recalled, .!:(2,80) = .45, NA.

A

test

of linear contrast showed no trend between depression and the number of
neutral words recalled, .!:(1,80)

=

.79, NS.

There was also no signifi-

cant relationship bet\veen depression and the number of happy words recalled, _I(2,80)

=

.29, NS.

A check for the linear relationship between

depression and happy words recalled was also not significant, .!:(1,80) ==
.57, NS.

Thirdly, there was no relationship between level of depression

and the number of sad words recalled, .!:(2,80) = 1.41, .2.
this latter relationship was considerably less likely to
than in the first two analyses.
!(1,80)

=

2.55, NS.

=

.2495,however,
~2ppen

by chance

The linear contrast again showed no trend,

In sum, there was no statistically significant dif-

ference betweeh levels of depression and the affective content of the
words remembered.

Each level of depression recalled approximately the

same number of happy words, each level of depression recalled approxin1ately
the same number of neutral words, and each level of depression recalled
approximately the same number of sad words.
In an effort to obtain results by using the entire range of depression scores as predictors, a group of regression analyses were also performed on the data.

A simple regression of the MDI full scale score's

ability to pred:Lct the number of happy \Wrds remembered approached significanc:P,

1:~(1,

81)

==

3. 03, _£_ = • 085.

A regression of the NTH full scale
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= .21,

score with the number of neutral words recalled, £(1,81)
with the number of sad words recalled, £(1,81)

N~

and

1.99, NS, yielded no

significant results.

Since the HDI had ten subscales of depression, it seemed reasonable
to also examine their contributions in more detail.

Table 5 shows the

summary of a regression analysis testing for the variance uniquely accounted for by each of the ten MDI subscales in recalling happy words.
The regression analysis showed that the ten MDI subscales accounted for

a statistically significant 27.70% of the variance in the number of happy words recalled, £(10,72)

= 2.76, .E.< .01.

Only one MDI subscale (Low

Self Esteem) was able to uniquely account for a significant pattern of
variance in the number of happy words recalled, £(1, 72) == 7. 41,

_E_ < • Cll.

However, the subscales for Sad Mood, Learned Helplessness, and Guilt approached significance,

(for Sad Mood, !_ (1, 72)

Learned Helplessness, £(1,72) = 2.95,

3.20,

_E_

= .07}.

_E_

=

3. 22, .E.

=

• 0 77;

for

= .09; and for Guilt, £(1,72)

Overall, the ten MDI subscales could not predict a sig-

nificant portion of the variance of the sad words recalled, !_(10,72)

1.41, NS.

=

Also, there were no statistically significant relationships

between the ten subscales and the nu:ober of neutral words recalled,

£(10,72) = .46, NS.
Overall, the hypothesis that depression would be related to affective content of what is recalled received minimal support.

Of the

several analyses performed, significant results Here only obtained in a
regression unalysis relating the contributions of the ten MDI subscales
tn

the number of happy words recalled.

One subscale, Low Self Esteem,
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TABLE 5
A Regression Analysis Testing for the Variance Uniquely Accounted for
by Individual Subscales in Recalling Happy Words

Subscale
Instrumen~al Helplessness

DF
1

Unique Variance
Accounted for
2.8375

f Value
1. 96

Pr > F
.1661

Low Self Esteem

1

10.7482

7.41

.0081*

Sad Mood

1

4.6704

3.22

.0769

Learned Helplessness

1

4. 2772

2.95

.0902

Energy Level (fatigue)

1

3.0821

2.13

.1492

Irritability

1

0.5817

0.40

.5285

Pessimism

1

2.6700

1.84

.1790

Cognitive Difficulty

1

2.0720

1.43

.2358

Guilt

1

4.791

3.30

.0733

Social Introversion

1

1.1140

o. 77

.3837

10

27.70

2.76

.0061*

10 MDI Sub scales
Note.

*.E. <.OS.

51
uniquely accounted for a significant portion of variance while three
other subscales approached significance.

Depression and Total Recall
Table 6 also suggested a trend between level of depression and the
total number of words recalled.

The table showed low depressives re-

membering an average of 8.389 words, medium depressives remembering about
8.909 words, and high depressives remembering an average of 8.952.

Such

a trend, if significant would be in the opposite direction of the hypothesis.

To test this data, another analysis of variance using three

level of depression as predictors was performed.

The analysis of variance

showed no relationship between the HDI full scale score and the total
number of words remembered, E(2,80)

=

.804, NS.

Further, a multiple re-

gression analysis indicated that the ten }IDI subscales were able to account for 21.656% of the variance however, this was not significant,
!(10,72)

=

1.99, NS.

In a step-wise multiple regression, the Low Self

Esteem scale and the Guilt subscale best predicted the total number of
words remembered.

Together they accounted for 16.7% of the variance.

The Guilt subscale uniquely accounted for 7% of the variance, E(l0,72)

=

6.585,

E

< .01 and the Low Self Esteem subscale accounted for 4.5%

of the variance, £(10,72) = 4.173, E < .01.
In sum, even though a visual trend suggested differences, the hypothesis relating level of depression to total amount of recall was not
statistically supported.

T\.;ro subsea] es uniquely accounted for signifi-

cant amounts of variances suggesting there may be a small relationship
between some particular traits found in depression and amount of total
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TABLE 6
A Step-wise Multiple Regression Analysis Testing for the Variance
Accounted for by Indivjdual Subscales in Total \.Jords Remembered

% of Unique Variance

Subscale
Guilt

Accounted for
7.165

% of Variance
Accounted for
6.108

Beta
Weights
.3914

6.585*

F

Low Self Esteem

4.541

10.588

. 3470

4.173*

Energy level (fatigue)

2.277

.915

.2302

2.093

Social Introversion

.901

1.040

.1133

.828

Irritability

.859

1.235

.1101

.789

.511

.1003

.457

Cognitive Difficulty
Pessimism

.707

.305

.1550

.650

Instrumental Helplessness

.417

.574

.0986

.384

.316

.0998

.307

.020

.0223

.018

Sad Hood
Learned Helplessness
10 J:.IDI Subscales

Note.

*2_ <

, 01.

.02

21.657

1.99
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recall.
Depression and Order of Recall
To analyze the order of the words remembered, the recalled t,.;rords
were divided into three groups, the first third of the words recalled,
the second third of the \vords recalled, and the last third of the words
recalled by each subject.

Happy words were rated 1, neutral words \vere

rated 2, and sad words were rated 3.

The average level of affect in

each of the three word groups was computed and regression analyses relating the total MDI scores to affect level in each word group were performed.

There was no relationship between the level of depression

(total MDI score) and the affect of the first group of words remembered,
£(1,80) = 1.11, NS.

Also , there was no significant relationship bet•veen

the level of depression and the affect of the second group of words remembered, £(1,80) == 3.72, NS,or the affect of the third group of words
remembered, £(1,80) = .494, NS.
A regression analysis relating the ten subscales' scores to affect
of the first group of words recalled, L(l0,71) = .71, NS, and second
group of words recalled, F(l0,72)

= .94, NS, were both not significant.

However, a regression analysis relating the subscale scores to affect
of the third group of words recalled was significant, £(10,72) =

J?_ < • 05.
_£ <

On closer analysis, the Sad Hood sub scale,

.01, a.ud the Learned Helplessness subscale, £(1. 72)

£(1, 72) = 6. 89,
=

4.09, E

uniquely accounted for a significant portion of the variance.
shO\vS

a

2.0~,

<

.05,

Table 7

sum.rnary of each of the ten subscales 1 relationship to the affect

of the third group of words recalled.
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TABLE 7
A Regression Analysis Relating Individual MDI Subscales to the Affect
of the Third Group of \·Jords Recalled

DF

Sub scale

Type IV SS

F

Pr > F

Instrumental Helplessness

1

.7835

3.10

.0826

Low Self Esteem

1

.6227

2.46

.1210

Sad Mood

1

.7!;31

6 .89M~

.0106

Learned Helplessness

1

1. 0351

4.09*

.0468

Energy Level (fatigue)

1

.5946

2.35

.1295

Irritability

1

.5973

2.36

.1287

Pessimism

1

,!:.763

1.88

.1742

Cognitive Difficulty

1

.!.,92!.;

1. 95

.1671

Guilt

1

.5753

2.28

.1358

Social Introversion

1

.0024

.01

.9227

10

5.1894

2.05

.0399

10 MDI Sub scales
Note.

*.E.
**_E_

<
<

.05
.01
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In

sun~ary,

a regression analysis relating the total MDI score to

order of the v1ords recalled showed no significant results.

When in-

specting the subscales' relationship to order of words recalled, it was
discovered that there was a significant relationship between the subscale score and the last third of the words recalled.

Specifically, the

Sad Hood and Learned Helplessness subscales were primarily responsible
for this significance; scores on these subtests were positively related
to recalling words of similar affect.

_Depression and Interjected Words
A one-way analysis of variance predicting the number of words added
from three levels of depression showed no relationship between level of
depression and total number of interjected words, !_(2,80)

= .327,

This hypothesis was also tested using a regression analysis.
predicting the number of words from the
no results, !_(1,81)

~fDI

NS.

An analysis

full scale score also yielded

.OS, NS.

To predict the affect of added

~ords

from three levels of depres-

sion, the added words were scaled according to their affect level in the
manner previously described and a MA.'\OVA was performed.
overall effect.

There was no

Four F scores were computed and none reached statistical

significance:
Hotelling-Lawley, Trace, !_(6,154) = 1.13, NS;
Pillai's Trace, !_(6,158)

1.14, NS;

Wilk's Criterion, !_(6,156) = 1.14, NS; and
Roy's Maximum Root Criterion, £0,80)

=

2.72, NS.

'J'his would lead one to believe that there were no mdvariate effects,
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which was indeed the case.

The one-way analysis of variance shoHs no

significant relationship between a person's level of depression and the
affect of the first word they may have added, K(2,80) = .90, NS; between the level of depression and the second word they may
K(2,80)

=

word they

have added,

.28, NS; or between the level of depression and the third
~ay

have added, K(2,80}

=

.80, NS.

Overall, there was no support for either the hypothesis that depression was related to the number of words a subject may have interjected into recall or the hypothesis that level of depression was related to the affect of words a subject may have interjected.

pepression and Associations
To test the hypothesis that emotion influences chain associations
to neutral stimuli, a procedure similar to Bower's was used.

Two judges

independently rated the subjects' chain associations as either made by
a happy, neutral, or sad person.

The criterion used to determine whether

the associations were influenced by emotion was the judges' ability to
correctly differentiate the depression level of the individual who made
the associations.

Table 8 is a

ratings of the associations.

su~uary

of the average of the judges'

The judges were able to accurately identify

depressed subjects an average of 33.3% of the time, neutral subjects
56.8% of the time, and happy subjects 36% of the time.

A Chi Square

performed on the nine possible ratings of the judges was not significant,
Chi Square (4)

=

5.54, NS.

at a significantly different

The judges were not rating the associations
from chance level.

When neutral responses

57

TABLE 8
Average Results Obtained When Judges Judged Chain Word Associations
into One of Three Levels of Depression

Associ2tions Judged As
Raw
Totals

Depressed

Neutral

Happy

7

12

2

21

Neutral

7.5

25

11.5

44

Happy

2.5

9

6.5

18

17

46

20

Depressed

Column
Totals

1--------1----------L----

I

83

_L____
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were discarded (as in Bower's research), associations of depressed subjects were accurately distinguished from happy subjects' associations
77.8% of the time.

Happy subjects' associations were accurately dis-

tinguished from depressed associations 72% of the time.

Theoretically

expected frequencies were too small to appropriately compute a two by
two analysis using only the four corners of the table.

So, although the

percentages appear to be large, a Chi Square was not computed.

In sum,

the hypothesis relating depression to associations of neutral stimuli
received minimal support.

DISCUSSIO~

This research was based on the general premise that mood is related to cognitive processes such as recall and associations.

In gener-

al, only minimal support was shown for some of the hypotheses associated
with this premise.

Specifically, a relationship between depression and

affective recall was apparent only in a regression analyses relating the
ten subscale scores to the number of happy words recalled.

Also, a

small relationship between the total number of words recalled and some
particular traits in depression was shown by the Low Self Esteem and
Guilt subscales accounting for a significant unique variances.

Again,

only minimal support was given to the hypothesis between depression and
the order of the words recalled when a regression analysis related two
sub scales to the last third of the '"ords each subject recalled.
the relationship between

depressio~

Lastly,

and associations to neutral words

was only given minimal support, i.e., although preliminary

analyses

were not significant, an analysis of the extreme scores (too small to
compute a Chi square) visually sup?orted the hypothesis.

These results seem rather inconsistent with Bm.,er' s '"ork and the
research of other cognitive theorists \vho have shown differences in
memory and cognitive process between depressed and nondepressed subjects.
The inconsistency in the results concerning depression and associations
are particularly disturbing since results have been obtained when using
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hypnotic manipulation or a Velton procedure.

Some explanations might

be offered to explain this study's failure to find a strong relationship between emotion and memory or associations.
First, one might hypothesize that these depression groups were not
distinct.

Even though the high depressed and low depressed subjects

were respectively scoring one standard deviation above and below the
mean on the MDI, that may not be a large enough_difference.

Indeed,

the subjects were taken from an academic setting and although their depression level was varied for this setting, the depressed subjects were
not considered clinically depressed.

To test the hypothesis that the

criteria for levels of depression in this experiment were not extreme
enough to show a difference, an analysis of variance was done using only
the ten least depressed subjects for the low depression group and only
the ten most depressed subjects for the high depression group.

This

analysis of variance, using only the extreme scores, sho\ved a significant relationship between level of depression and affect of words remembered, X(2,36)

= 3.27,

.E_ <

.05.

Table 9 summarizes the mean words

recalled by the different levels of extreme depression.

It shows an

even clearer trend in the direction of the hypothesis than was evident
in Tables 3 and 4.

This analysis supports the speculation that the de-

pression groups were not distinct and offers considerable encouragement
for future research in this area.

Future studies examining

affectiv~

content of recall should use subjects exhibiting a brander range of
depression.
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TABLE 9
Mean Words Recalled When Using Only the Ten Most Extreme Scores
Obtained on the Depression Level Continuum

Happy Words
Recalled
Ten Least
Depressed Subjects

13.4

Ten Most
Depressed Subjects

2.4

Neutral Words Sad Words
Recalled
Recalled
-·

Total Words
Recalled

2.6

2.5

8.2

2.3

3.5

8.5

62
Similar analyses using the ten most extreme subjects on each end
of the depression scale were performed on the other hypotheses Hith
less encouraging results.

An analysis of variance relating depression

and total amount of recall still yielded no significant results, £(1,18)

=

4.41, NS.

A visual examination of depression and amount of words in-

terjected showed the number of interjections for those scoring extremely high or extremely low on the depression scale was almost identical,
reinforcing the previous conclusion that level of depression is unrelated to the number of words interjected.

Hhen examining the tHenty most

extreme cases for differences in the affect of the words they may have
interjected, the ten highest depressives interjected four happy words
c_~nd

two sad words while the ten lm.;rest depressives interjected six happy

words and one

E~ad

a neutral word.

word.

None of the t\.;renty extreme subjects interjected

A Chi Square can not be computed on this data because

of the small frequencies.

One might speculate, however, that future

examination of this phenomenon with a large group might yield significant results.

All in all, post hoc analyses on the hypotheses (other

than the relationship between depression and affective recall) yielded
no significant results.
A second possibJ.e explanation for the failure of this study to
find a relationship between depression and memory or associations might
be the choice of words.

The happy and sad words were chosen from the

DACL which generally differentiates betHeen depressives and nondepressives.

In this study however, there Has no guarantee that a word

63
stimulated the affect in a particular subject hypothesized by the experimenter.

For instance, the word "wonderful" which was categorized

as happy in the experiment may, because of an individual experience,
have been seen as a neutral or depressing word by a particular subject.
Another subject may see "guarantee" as a happy word \vhen it was categorized as a neutral word in the experiment.

Furthermore, in the pre-

sent research, the experimenter was unable to determine how much affect
was related to a particular stimulus word.

For instance, do "animate"

and "lucky" present generally equal amounts of positive feelings as
stimulus words?

If so, then do they present equal amounts of positive

feelings to different individuals?

One might also ask if the affect

of the positive words was as extreme as the affect of the
and how neutral were the neutral words?

negativ~

words

In this research, it was diffi-

cult to determine if the affect of the stimulus word was the same for
all subjects and if the same amount of affect was generated by each word
to each subject.

This explanation would account for an analysis of

variance relating depression to amount of sad words remembered to be
approaching significance while ANOVAs relating depression to the recall
of happy, or neutral words did not i.e., perhaps the sad words were more
uniformly extreme affective stimuli for more subjects.

To control for

thir.; in the future, each subject should rate each stimulus word on a
depression continuum.

A third explanation for finding minimal or no significant relationship between depression and amount of total recall, ordering of recall,
number of interjections, or affect of interjections may be that there
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actually is not relationship between depression and these aspects of
memory.

Other variables may be operating here.

was observed during the experiment.

One such phenomenon

After subjects initially recalled

the words they could remember, the experimenter routinely asked if they
wished to have more time.

On almost all occasions subjects recalled a

few more \-lOrds which were also recorded.

After some time the experiment-

er observed that subjects varied widely on the number of \<lords they
would initially recall before giving up.

They also seemed to vary con-

siderably on the number of words they were able to recall after the experimenter's con@ent.

Some subjects persevered longer and remembered

more words before saying they were done and some gave up rather easily.
The interesting fact here is that all subjects averaged approximately
the same total recall, so those that gave up easily remembered less after the experimenter's prompt.

An interesting phenomenon to study during future research on
memory is at what point in the recall the subject requires prompting.
Here,depressed subjects seemed to give up more easily and require
prompting earlier in the recall period, i.e., the subjects exhibited
a performance deficit

r~ther

than a memory deficit.

This hypothesis

would agree with Ferster's hypothesis that depressed individuals exhibit decreased behavior (1973), Seligman and associates' hypothesis of
lower compet.iveness and behavioral passivity in depressives (Powell
and Creer, 1969; Maier, Anderson, and Liberman, 1972), and the ideas
that depressives have less confidence in themselves (Beck, 1967) and
"expect the worst" (Friedman, 1964).

Hhere there might be no actual
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memory differences, future research using the MDI might yield a relationship between depression and performance differences.

In fact, this

might account for the choice of the two subscales which did uniquely
account for a significant portion of the variance, the Low Self Esteem
and Guilt subscales.

People who score high on the Low Self Esteera scale

report feelings of inadequacy and incompetence while those scoring high
on the Guilt subscale typically evaluate personal actions as negative.
Even though the subjects were prompted, these may still be picking up
performance differences rather than any ar:tual memory differences.

In

sura, the third possibility this study obtained little or no significant
results between depression and several aspects of memory may be because
there genuinely is no relationship.

Supposed relationships may be sug-

gested by performance deficits in depressed subjects rather than any_
actual memory differences.

With the limitations of the study in mind then, this research still
contributes to Bower's preliminary Kork in relating depression to cognitive processes.

First, this study did report significant differences

between high and low depressed subjects in their immediate affective recall.

It is certainly encouraging that a significant relationship be-

t\V'een mood and memory was found in a study in which the design had
significant limitations.

TI1is leads one to believe that the relevance

of the mood-congruous effect on memory on naturally-occurring emotions
is significant and an area worthy of future research.

In addition to

studying depressive affect, one might presume to find significant results using anger, sad and frightened affects as well.

Secondly,
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although there may be no differences in the total encouraged amount of
immediate recall between high and lmv depressed subjects, there is probably a strong expectation difference which affects the subjects' initial
effort at response.

This expectation and resulting performance bias

might well be predictable by a knowledge of the subject's depression.
Furthermore, it seems significant to explore whether these performance
differences are indeed a result of differential expectations which can
be minimized by a mere statement of openness by the researcher rather
than something more deep seated or an actual difference in capability.
Such information seems valuable for those in clinical work.

A third

area of impact on Bower's preliminary research is the yet unclear relationship between depressive affect and ordering of significant recall
responses found in this study.

More research is needec

~o

clarify pos-

sible organizational or conceptual differences in the cognitive processes of depressed subjects.

This study also contributes to Bower's preliminary \wrk by showing
memory differences related to extreme levels of naturally-occurring
mood found in a normal college population.

Some of the earlier reserva-

tions of previous researchers concerning the need to strongly manipulate
the subjects' mood to obtain results, the "realness" of the mood induced,
possible demand characteristics resulting from evident

n~od

inducements,

and generalizability of previous lab findings are minimized by this design.

More theoretically, the results of this study provide some support

67
for Bower's notion of the associative network theory of behavior, i.e.,
that emotion serves as a memory unit.

The activation of emotion serves

as a retrieval aid which affects cognitions and the resulting behavior.
Specifically, Bower's theory of mood-congruous memory was supported
when this study found a significant difference in the affective content
between high and low depressed subjects.

Future research should in-

vestigate performance measures involved in selective memory.

On yet a broader spectrum, this study contributes to the continually evolving literature on depression and predicting depressive behavior.

Studies such as this highlight the complexity of the relation-

ship between cognition and emotion and the need for a better understanding of the role that processes such as selective attention and memory
may play in this relationship.

SUMMARY

This study investigated the relationship between level

of depres-

sion and two cognitive processes, immediate recall and •wrd associations.
Specifically, the study looked at the relationship between various levels
of depression found naturally in a college population to the content
of affect-laden recall, amount of total recall, ordering of recall,
amount and content of interjections, and chain associations to neutral
words.

A significant relationship between level of depression and af-

fective content of immediate recall was found when college subjects
scored on the extreme ends of the depression scale.

There was some

evidence that level of depression was related to the ordering or recall
i.e., the Sad Mood and Learned Helplessness subscales on the MDI were
related to the affect of the third group of words recalled.

Three pos-

sible explanations were given for the study's failure to find more significant relationships and for improving the procedure for future research.

The results of this study provided some support for Bower's

associative network theory of emotions which conceptualizes emotion as
a memory unit affecting cognitions.

SpecificalJy, the results supported

Bower's theory of mood-congruous memory.

The implications of these re-

sults for cognitJve theories of depression were also discussed.
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